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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

WILLIAM KEITH REIGENBORN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20000113-CA
Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Reigenborn's right to
due process by denying the defense's motion to continue the trial?

Standard of Review: The grant or denial of a motion to continue is within the trial court's
discretion. State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474,476 (Utah App. 1991). Absent a clear abuse of
discretion, this Court will not reverse the trial court's decision. Id In order to demonstrate a
clear abuse of discretion, the moving party must demonstrate that it was "materially prejudiced
by the court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the
continuance been granted." IdL, citing State v. Barker, 35 Wash.App. 388, 667 P.2d 108, 114
(1983). See also Lavton City v. Longcrier. 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Reigenborn his constitutional right to
counsel of his choosing?

Standard of Review: An accused in a criminal proceeding enjoys a federal and state
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when charged with an offense which may be
punished by imprisonment. See U.S. Const., Amend VI; Utah Const, art. 1, Sec. 12; Argersinger

v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528,
530 (Utah 1978). If an accused is able or employ counsel, he or she has the right to
representation by an attorney of his or her choice; if an accused is indigent, he or she is entitled
to court-appointed counsel. Webster, 587 P»2d at 530; State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120,121
(Utah 1986).
3.

Whether Mr. Reigenborn was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by the trial
court's denial of his motion to continue?

Standard of Review: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995) (quoting
U.S. Const, amend. VI). The guarantee to assistance of counsel has been held to mean the right
to effective assistance of counsel. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993 V "Denying
a continuance may result in the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.1'
State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993).
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion to
withdraw?

Standard of Review: The trial court's decision to grant or deny counsel's motion to
withdraw in a criminal case is discretionary and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(l).
5.

Whether Mr. Reigenborn was denied his constitutional right to compulsory process?

Standard of Review: In order to demonstrate a violation of the constitutional right to
compulsory process, a defendant must make some plausible showing the testimony of the absent
witness "would have been both material and favorable to his defense." State v. Schreuder, 712
P.2d 264,274 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 873,102
S. Ct. 3440, 3449, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (footnote omitted)). Testimony is deemed material
and its exclusion prejudicial "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the
outcome of the trial." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, amendment VI
United States Constitution, amendment XIV
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102
2

STATEMENT OF CASE
William Reigenborn was charged with assault based on an incident in September 1998
wherein Mr. Reigenborn was alleged to have assaulted and caused substantial bodily injury to
Kenneth Pace. At the arraignment, the Honorable Joseph Fratto appointed the Salt lake Legal
Defender Association to represent Mr. Reigenborn. At the pretrial conference, Mr. Reigenborn
was represented by Nisa Sisneros, an attorney with the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, at
which time a jury trial date was set. The original trial date was continued by the court due to a
higher priority case going forward on the same date. At the next hearing, Mr. Reigenborn
appeared with defense counsel and informed the court of his desire to hire private counsel. The
next date for trial was continued at the request of the prosecutor. Finally, a jury trial was set for
July 27,1999. Mr. Reigenborn appeared on the jury trial date and both he and Ms. Sisneros
requested a continuance due to lack of contact and Mr. Reigenborn's desire to hire private
counsel. The court denied the motion and the case proceeded to jury trial wherein Mr.
Reigenborn was convicted of assault, as charged.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 7,1999, an information was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, charging William Keith Reigenborn
with one count of assault, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. (R.
1-2.) The charge stemmed from a single incident on September 2,1998, wherein Mr.
Reigenborn was alleged to have pushed and hit Kenneth Pace a number of times. (R. 2.) On
January 26,1999, Mr. Reigenborn appeared before the Honorable Joseph Fratto for an
arraignment. (R. 11-13.) On the basis of Mr. Reigenborn's indigence and considering the
3

seriousness of the charge, the court appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to
represent Mr. Reigenbom. (R. 12.) The court then set the matter for a pretrial conference on
February 23, 1999, at 9:00 a.m. (R. 11.)
On February 9,1999, Nisa Sisneros, an attorney with the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, filed her notice of appearance and request for discovery. (R. 16-19.) On February
23,1999, Mr. Reigenbom appeared at the pretrial conference with Ms. Sisneros and requested a
jury trial, which the court set for March 25,1999. (R. 20.) When Ms. Sisneros and Mr.
Reigenbom appeared for trial on March 25, they were informed by the court that a higher priority
case was going forward that day and Mr. Reigenbom's trial date would be reset. (R. 20.) At that
time, Mr. Reigenbom informed the court of his desire to hire private counsel. The matter was
reset for jury trial on May 20,1999. (R. 20.)
On May 20,1999, Mr. Reigenbom appeared before Judge Fratto and informed the court
of his desire to hire private counsel. (Pretrial Conference Tr. "PTC Tr." 2.)1 Ms. Sisneros moved
to withdraw as counsel, but her motion was denied. (PTC Tr. 3.) The court ordered Ms.
Sisneros to continue to represent Mr. Reigenbom but informed her that she could withdraw from
representation as soon as Mr. Reigenbom retained private counsel. (PTC Tr. 3.) The jury trial
was then reset for July 13,1999. (PTC Tr. 3; R. 24.) On June 8,1999, the state moved to
continue the trial due to the unavailability of witnesses and the court granted that motion,
resetting the trial for July 27,1999. (R. 25-30.) On July 8,1999, Ms. Sisneros sent a notice to
1

The original transcripts, which are part of the record on appeal, were not given a record
cite by the district court. Defense counsel contacted Paulette Stagg at the clerk's office and was
informed that reference to the different transcripts should be made clear but that the appeal could
proceed despite this lack of pagination.
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Mr. Reigenborn at his 2196 East Lamboume Avenue address in Salt Lake City, informing him
that the date for jury trial was July 27,1999, and requesting that he contact her.
On July 27,1999, Mr. Reigenbom appeared before the Honorable Judge Fratto and
moved to continue the trial so that he could retain private counsel. (Jury Trial Tr. "J.T. Tr." 4.)
Mr. Reigenbom explained that he was a long-haul truck driver and had spoken with an attorney
but had been unable to meet with that attorney in person. (J.T. Tr. 4.) The court denied the
motion. (J.T. Tr. 4-5.) Mr. Reigenbom then stated "She won't subpoena anybody for me." (J.T.
Tr. 5:2-3.) "She says she can't get ahold of somebody on the phone. That-she's got their
address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing without no witnesses." (J.T. Tr. 5:6-9.) "I've told
her several times to subpoena people for me- -" (J.T. Tr. 5:13-14.) Defense counsel then
renewed her motion to continue and her motion to withdraw, pointing out that Mr. Reigenbom
had not contacted her regarding his case and she did not believe she could effectively represent
him. (J.T. Tr. 6:8-25.) Ms. Sisneros also noted that she believed Mr. Reigenbom may qualify
for a number of defenses but that she had insufficient contact with Mr. Reigenbom to pursue
such defenses. (J.T. Tr. 6:19-23.) The court denied both motions, noting that if defense counsel
was less than prepared it was the result of Mr. Reigenbom not having contact with her and that it
was his burden to shoulder; the matter proceeded to jury trial. (J.T. Tr. 7:1-5.)
Thereafter a six-person jury was chosenfroma pool of 16 potential jurors. (R. 62-63;
J.T. Tr. 9-40.) The jury then heard opening statementsfromcounsel, followed by the
presentation of testimony from Sharon Snipes, Kenneth Pace, and Edward Lynch. (J.T. Tr. 57134.) Ms. Snipes is Mr. Reigenbom's ex-wife, Mr. Pace is the victim in this matter, and Officer
Lynch is the officer who investigated the matter on behalf of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
5

Office.
Ms. Snipes testified that on September 2,1998, Mr. Reigenborn resided in the basement
apartment at 2196 East Lambourne Avenue in Salt Lake City while Ms. Snipes' mother lived
upstairs. (J.T. Tr. 67:15-16; 68:7-9.) That morning, Ms. Snipes testified that she telephoned Mr.
Reigenborn's apartment but no one answered. (J.T. Tr 68-69.) Ms. Snipes testified that she then
called her mother and was told that Mr. Reigenborn had already left for work. (J.T. Tr. 69:1-3.)
Based upon her understanding that Mr. Reigenborn would not be at the 2196 East Lambourne
Avenue address, Ms. Snipes proceeded to that address with Kenneth Pace and her son, Nathan,
so that Nathan could retrieve some school clothes. (J.T. Tr. 69.)
Upon arriving at the 2196 East Lambourne address, Nathan went down the steps to Mr.
Reigenborn's apartment. (J.T. Tr. 69:18-19.) When Nathan walked back up the stairs, Mr.
Reigenborn was right behind him. (J.T. Tr. 69:19-20.) At that time. Mr. Reigenborn told Ms.
Snipes that he was on the phone with suicide hotline (J.T. Tr. 69:22-25.) Mr. Reigenborn then
made a statement to the effect that if he went to jail, he would not have to die. (J.T. Tr. 69-70.)
Immediately thereafter, Mr. Pace attempted to get in the driver's seat of Ms. Snipes' vehicle
when "[Mr. Reigenborn] grabbed ahold of him and threw him into the bushes." (J.T. Tr 70:1113.) At this point, Ms. Snipes went downstairs and called 9-1-1. (J.T. Tr. 70:14-15.) Ms. Snipes
testified that in total, she observed Mr. Reigenborn hit Mr. Pace five or six times in the face with
his fist. (J.T. Tr. 73:2-4.) Ms. Snipes was able to get Mr. Pace in the vehicle and transport him
to St. Mark's Hospital. (J.T. 73:13-14.)

Following the incident, Ms. Snipes observed that the

left side of Mr. Pace's jaw was swollen and puffy, his nose was displaced and both of his eyes
were black. (J.T. Tr. 74:14-19; plaintiffs exhibit 8.)
6

On cross-examination Ms. Snipes admitted that she was aware Mr. Reigenbom had some
emotional problems generally and specifically with regard to dealing with her. (J.T. Tr. 78-79.)
She also clarified that Mr. Reigenbom was on the cordless phone with suicide prevention as he
approached her. (J.T. Tr. 79:14-22.) Finally, Ms. Snipes testified that Mr. Reigenbom was upset,
angry, and yelling, and described his appearance as f,[d]emonic,f and noted that the veins on his
face were bulging. (J.T. Tr.81.)
The jury then heard testimonyfromMr. Pace. Mr. Pace testified that at about 7:30 or
8:00 a.m. on September 2,1998, he, Ms. Snipes and Nathan, went to Mr. Reigenbom's
apartment, located at 2196 East Lamboume Avenue, to pick up some school clothes for Nathan.
(J.T. Tr. 86:22-25.) When they pulled into the driveway, Mr. Pace was assisting Ms. Snipes and
Nathan out of the car when Mr. Reigenbom exited his apartment through the back door of the
home. (J.T. Tr. 89: 9-11.) Mr. Pace testified that he heard Mr. Reigenbom tell Ms. Snipes that
he was on the phone with suicide hotline and then overhead him engage in a verbal confrontation
with Ms. Snipes. (J.T. Tr. 89:18-25.) Immediately thereafter, Mr. Reigenbom came toward Mr.
Pace and said: "'But if I go to jail, I won't have to commit suicide.'" (J.T. Tr. 90:3-4.) Mr.
Reigenbom then proceeded to chase Mr. Pace and hit him with his fists. (J.T. Tr. 90:4-6.) Mr.
Pace testified that Mr. Reigenbom "had that rage look in his eyes" (J.T. Tr. 90:11-12) when he
attacked Mr. Pace and that Mr. Reigenbom hit him about 30 to 40 times, mostly in the face. (J.T.
Tr. 93:13-14.) Mr. Pace was finally able to get back into the vehicle at which time Ms. Snipes
transported him to the hospital. Mr. Pace suffered a broken nose, a cracked jaw and some
chipped teeth as aresult of the altercation. (J.T. Tr. 91:12-13; 95:20-21.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Pace acknowledged that he aware Mr. Reigenbom harbored
7

some anger over the fact that Mr. Pace was with Ms. Snipes. (J.T. Tr. 101:4-6.) Mr. Pace also
admitted that he aware of the uneasy relationship between Ms. Snipes and Mr. Reigenborn. (J.T.
Tr. 102:12-13.) Mr. Pace testified that Mr. Reigenborn came toward him with "anger", "rage"
and "meanness" in his eyes such that Mr. Pace testified he had "never seen anything like that in
my life before, to be honest with you." (J.T. Tr. 106:19-21.)
Finally, the state called Deputy Sheriff Edward Lynch of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office to testify. Deputy Lynch testified that he first met Ms. Snipes and Mr. Pace at the St
Mark's Hospital Emergency Room. (J.T. Tr. 110:1-3.) Deputy Lynch testified that he observed
Mr. Pace's nose to be swollen, "not shaped like a nose would be shaped" and noticed that Mr.
Pace had scratches and abrasions on his hands, and that his jaw seemed to be "a little swollen."
(J.T. Tr. 110-11.) Deputy Lynch also testified that he was unable to make contact with Mr.
Reigenborn with regard to the incident. (J.T. Tr. I l l :8-17.) At this point, the state rested. (J.T.
Tr. 114:16-17.)
Outside the presence of the jury, Ms. Sisneros moved for a directed verdict on the bases
that the government failed to meet its burden, particularly with regard to proving that Mr.
Reigenborn committed the offense with the requisite intent. (J.T. Tr. 115-16.) Ms. Wissler, the
deputy district attorney, opposed the motion, arguing that the issue of intent was an issue strictly
for the jury and that based on the evidence presented, the jury could easily find Mr. Reigenborn
possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime of assault. (J.T. Tr. 116-17.) The court denied
the motion for a directed verdict, concluding that the state had presented at least a prima facie
case with regard to each element necessary to prove Mr. Reigenborn committed the crime of
assault. (J.T.Tr. 118:3-6.)
8

Following a short recess, the defense rested without calling any witnesses. (J.T. Tr.
119:21-22.) The court read jury instructions and then counsel made closing argument.
Thereafter, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict finding Mr. Reigenbom guilty of assault
with substantial bodily injury. (J.T. Tr. 147.)
The court ordered a presentence report to be completed prior to sentencing. (J.T. Tr.
150:11-13.) On January 10, 2000, Mr. Reigenbom appeared before the court for sentencing.
The court imposed a one-year jail sentence, suspended, and ordered 18 months of courtsupervised probation. (Sentencing Transcript "S. Tr." 7:14-20.) The court also imposed a
$1,500 fine, suspending $750. (S. Tr. 7:16-18.) The following conditions of probation were
ordered by the court: (1) that Mr. Reigenbom violate no laws; (2) that Mr. Reigenbom pay the
$750 fine in its entirety; (3) that Mr. Reigenbom perform 100 hours of community at a rate of 15
hours per month, with monthly proof submitted to the court on February 15,2000, and the 15th of
each month thereafter; (4) that Mr. Reigenbom maintain full-time employment or attend classes
full-time or do each part-time; (5) that Mr. Reigenbom complete any treatment recommended by
the Veteran's Administration; and (6) that Mr. Reigenbom attend group therapy through the
Veteran's Administration two times per week. (S. Tr. 7-8.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Reigenbom was denied his constitutional rights to due process and his sixth
amendment right to counsel when the district court would not grant him a continuance to retain
private counsel. The denial of the continuance also denied Mr. Reigenbom his constitutional
right to compulsory process and his constitutional right to counsel of his choosing.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
DEFENSE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense's motion to continue and

requiring defense counsel to proceed to jury trial given the lack of contact between defense
counsel and Mr. Reigenborn and Mr. Reigenborn's desire to retain private counsel. The grant or
denial of a motion to continue is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474,
476 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Humphervs. 707 P.2d 109,109 (Utah 1985) (per curiam);
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093,1094
(Utah 1975)). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will not reverse the trial court's
decision. Id In order to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, the moving party must
demonstrate that it was "materially prejudiced by the court's denial of the continuance or that the
trial result would have been different had the continuance been granted." IdL (citing State v.
Barken 35 Wash.App. 388, 667 P.2d 108,114 (1983)). See also Lavton City v. Longcrier, 943
P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997). The factors to be considered in determining whether the trial
court's denial of a defendant's request for a continuance to obtain counsel constitutes an abuse of
discretion include:
[1] whether other continuances have been requested and granted; [2] the balanced
convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court;
[3] whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory,
purposeful, or contrived; [4] whether the defendant contributed to the
circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance;... [and 5]
whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to
defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial
nature.
United States v. Burton. 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (quoted with approval in Lavton
10

City v. Longcrier. 946 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997)).
It appears from the record that the only prior continuance in this matter was requested by
the state. (R. 25-30.) It does not appear that the defense requested a continuance other than the
one requested on July 27,1999, which the court denied. Moreover, there is nothing in the record
to indicate that the trial court attempted to balance the inconvenience of witnesses, counsel, and
the court against the rights of Mr. Reigenborn. Mr. Reigenborn had a legitimate reason for
failing to secure private counsel; he is a long-haul truck-driver and was not in town long enough
to set a meeting with private counsel. (J.T. Tr. 4.) While Mr. Reigenborn bears some
responsibility for failing to secure private counsel, certainly he should have been given the same
opportunity as the state was given in this matter: one continuance.
When the trial court denied the motion to continue, Mr. Reigenborn stated: "She [defense
counsel] won't subpoena anybody for me." (J.T. Tr. 5:2-3.) "She says she can't get ahold [sic]
of somebody on the phone. That- she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing
without no witnesses." (J.T. Tr. 5:6-9.) "I've told her several times to subpoena people for me- -"
(J.T. Tr. 5:13-14.) Defense counsel then renewed her motion to continue, pointing out that Mr.
Reigenborn had not contacted her regarding his case and she did not believe she could effectively
represent him. Defense counsel also noted that she believed Mr. Reigenborn may qualify for a
number of defenses but that she had insufficient contact with Mr. Reigenborn to pursue such
defenses. (J.T. Tr. 6.) The court denied both motions, noting that if defense counsel was less
than prepared it was the result of Mr. Reigenborn not having contact with her; the matter
proceeded to jury trial wherein Mr. Reigenborn was convicted of class A misdemeanor assault.
(J.T. Tr. 7:1-5.)
11

The record reflects that the trial court was informed by Mr. Reigenborn that there were
witnesses he wanted to call in his defense who were not present on the trial date but who could
provide favorable testimony. (J.T. Tr. 5.) Moreover, defense counsel informed the court of her
belief that Mr. Reigenborn may qualify for a number of defenses which she could not pursue
effectively given Mr. Reigenborn's lack of contact with her prior to trial. (J.T. Tr. 5.)
One witness Mr. Reigenborn sought to call was Ms. Snipes' mother. Ms. Snipes' mother
lived at 2196 East Lambourne above the apartment where Mr. Reigenborn resided. Ms. Snipes'
mother could have either confirmed or contradicted Ms. Snipes' testimony that a call had been
placed to Mr. Reigenborn's apartment and to Ms. Snipes' mother with regard to Mr.
Reigenborn's presence at or absence from the residence. Moreover, the testimony presented at
trial indicates that at the time of the incident, Mr. Reigenborn suffered from a mental illness to
the extent that a diminished capacity defense may have been appropriate to negate the mens rea
necessary to convict Mr. Reigenborn of the intentional crime of assault. Surely Ms. Snipes'
mother could have provided some testimony and insight as to Mr. Reigenborn's state of mind
and mental health during the time leading up to this instance. However, defense counsel was
unable to call Ms. Snipes or pursue this defense due to the trial court's denial of a continuance.2
The trial court did not attempt to reconcile the interests of the state in proceeding to trial
and those of Mr. Reigenborn in receiving a continuance either to retain private counsel or meet
with court-appointed counsel. Certainly the trial court could have accommodated both interests
2

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (l)(a) (1999), "[i]t is a defense to a prosecution
under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental
state required as an element of the offense charged." This includes the defenses of insanity and
diminished mental capacity. Utah Code. Ann. § 76-2-305(2).
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by offering Reigenborn the option of continuing the trial but requiring Mr. Reigenborn to pay
witness and/or juror fees, thereby imposing some penalty on Mr. Reigenborn for the delay while
also providing a disincentive for additional delay by Mr. Reigenborn in procuring private
counsel. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense's
motion to continue.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. REIGENBORN'S RIGHT TO
REPRESENTATION BY AN ATTORNEY OF HIS CHOOSING
The trial court committed error in denying Mr. Reigenborn the opportunity to exercise his

right to employ an attorney of his choice. An accused in a criminal proceeding enjoys a federal
and state constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when charged with an offense which
may be punished by imprisonment. See U.S. Const, amend VI; Utah Const, art. 1, Sec. 12;
Argersineer v.Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Webster v. Jones.
587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978). If an accused is able to employ counsel, he or she has the right
to representation by an attorney of his or her choice; if an accused is indigent, he or she is
entitled to court-appointed counsel. Webster, 587 P.2d at 530; State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d
120, 121 (Utah 1986).
Here, Mr. Reigenborn expressed his desire and intent to hire private counsel. Mr.
Reigenborn informed the court on the day of jury trial that he had made contact with a specific
attorney and was in the process of setting up a meeting with that attorney. (J.T. Tr. 5.) Despite
this explicit expression of the desire to retain private counsel and Mr. Reigenborn's expression of
dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel, the trial court required Mr. Reigenborn to proceed
to trial that day with court-appointed counsel. While it is true that Mr. Reigenborn had
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previously expressed his intention to hire private counsel and had failed to do so by the date of
trial, Mr. Reigenborn did inform the trial court that his job as a long-haul trucker kept him away
from home and made it difficult for him to retain private counsel in a timely manner. This is not
a case of willful delay but one of excusable neglect. There is nothing in the record to support a
conclusion that the state would be prejudiced by the trial court's grant of a continuance, i.e., that
witnesses would fail to appear if a new date were to be set by the court.
Under these circumstances, certainly Mr. Reigenborn's right to choice of counsel
outweighs any interest the state had in moving forward on the date set for trial. Mr. Reigenborn
was prejudiced because he was forced to proceed to trial represented by counsel with whom he
had had limited contact with and with whom he did not believe was properly looking out for his
interests. Thus, the trial court should have granted a continuance to permit Mr. Reigenborn to
hire private counsel.
m.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DENIED MR.
REIGENBORN HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In denying Mr. Reigenborn's request for a continuance, the trial court denied Mr.

Reigenborn his constitutional right to counsel by forcing the matter to trial despite defense
counsel's lack of preparedness. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that ff[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend VI (quoted in Salt Lake City v.
Grotepas. 906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995)). The guarantee of assistance of counsel has been held
to mean the right to effective assistance of counsel. Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah
1993). "A serious lack of preparation might, in some circumstances, have such a
14

disadvantageous effect on a defendant's representation as to rise to a constitutional violation."
State v. Pursifell 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1987). When lack of preparation by defense
counsel is at issue, ff[d]enying a continuance may result in the violation of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel." State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993).
In Pursifell 746 P.2d at 272, the a defendant requested substitute counsel on the day of
trial based on his feeling that appointed counsel had not done everything she could have in his
case. The trial court inquired into the defendant's complaint and, after concluding that defense
counsel had done a good job in representing the defendant's interests, denied defendant's motion
for substitute counsel The matter proceed to jury trial and the defendant was convicted of
burglary, attempted burglary, two counts of theft, and two counts of vehicle burglary.
In evaluating the defendant's claim on appeal, the Court noted that
when a complaint is registered by a criminal defendant concerning his or her
appointed counsel, the court must balance the potential for last minute delay and
the propensity for manipulation of the system against the competing concern
about the likely inability of indigent defendants to articulate and communicate
their dissatisfaction in a setting which most laypersonsfindquite intimidating.
Pursifell 746 P.2d at 273. When such dissatisfaction is expressed, the trial court must employ
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's
complaints and to apprise [sic] itself of the facts necessary to determine whether
the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to
the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for
substitution. Even when the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and delay the
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.
Id (citing United States v. Weltv. 674 F.2d 185,187 (2d Cir. 1967)).
Applying this analysis, the Pursifell Court concluded that the trial court had properly
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inquired into the defendant's concerns by asking the defendant to identify the specific way in
which counsel had not represented his interests. The defendant indicated that he had met with
counsel on only one occasion and that he had not been timely informed of a court hearing on
defense counsel's motion for discovery. Id at 273. On the basis of the defendant's complaints,
the court asked both the prosecutor and defense counsel about the discovery motion. The
appellate court noted that this inquiry was sufficient and although the trial court should have
inquired further into the defendant's complaints with respect counsel's pretrial preparation,
failure to do so was not reversible error. Id. at 273-74. Notably, the Court concluded that "a
single, face-to-face meeting before trial is not, in itself, indicative of a lack of preparation in
cases like the instant one." IcL at 274. (Footnote omitted.)
Similarly, in the instant matter, Mr. Reigenborn requested a continuance to retain private
counsel to substitute for court-appointed counsel. Mr. Reigenborn expressed his desire to retain
private counsel and clearly expressed his concerns regarding court-appointed counsel to the trial
court. With respect to this concern, the following colloquy took place between the trial court and
Mr. Reigenborn:
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me.
THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing
without no witnesses.
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for
me - 16

THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be.
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If-if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove youfromthe courtroom, we'll
proceed in the trial without your presence.
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.)
The trial court here did not engage Mr. Reigenborn in the type of questioning designed to
get to the heart of his complaints with respect to counsel. Mr. Reigenborn clearly expressed his
concerns, which the court cursorily dismissed. Moreover, defense counsel informed the court
that she had had no contact with Mr. Reigenborn, asidefromseeing him in court on scheduled
court dates. There was no face-to-face meeting as there was in Pursifell and the potential
diminished mental capacity defense makes this case much more complicated than a routine
assault case would be, even for experienced trial counsel. Under these circumstances, Mr.
Reigenborn was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his conviction should be
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In light of Mr. Reigenborn's dissatisfaction and lack of contact with appointed counsel,

the trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw. A trial
court's decision to grant or deny counsel's motion to withdraw is discretionary and will be
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997); Utah
Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(1)(B) ("A motion to withdraw as an attorney in a criminal case shall
be made in open court with the defendant present unless otherwise ordered by the court.").
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As previously noted, defense counsel had had no pretrial contact with Mr. Reigenborn,
asidefromspeaking with him at court hearings. Defense counsel informed the trial court of Mr.
Reigenborn's desire to retain private counsel and the court heard directlyfromMr. Reigenborn
with regard to his complaints about defense counsel. Mr. Reigenborn expressed the following
concerns to the court:
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me.
THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing
without no witnesses.
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for
me -THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be.
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If-if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove you from the courtroom, we'll
proceed in the trial without your presence.
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.) It is clear from this exchange that Mr. Reigenborn harbored serious concerns
about court-appointed counsel. The court did not inquire into these concerns but merely told Mr.
Reigenborn that the case would be proceeding to trial. Clearly, from Mr. Reigenborn's
perspective, the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated to the point where Mr. Reigenborn
did not believe counsel could or would adequately represent his interests. Under these
circumstances, absent the court granting the motion to continue, the court should have granted
18

defense counsel's motion to withdraw and the failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion.
MR. REIGENBORN WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITIITM )NAl, RIGHT TO
COMPULSORY PROCESS
The trial court's refusal to grant a continuance resulted in a denial of Mr. Reigenborn's
constitutional right to compulsory process as secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section I l il iln I Ihh \ i nslilul i
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
obtaining w itnesses in his fa\ 01

tah Const, art.

MS I unsl iiiinul \ I m""!

* have compulsory process for
.ec

• • juaranteeing to a criminal

defendant the right "to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of w itnesses in his
own behalf."). In order to demonstrate a violation of the constitutional right to compulsory
piixvss, .I defniiilLiii'il mii',1 HUIIM soiinn pl.iusilik' shossiny IIMI I lie testimony of the absent witness
"would have been both material and favorable to his defense." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264,
2 ; I (I Jtah 1985) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-BernaL 458 U.S. 858, 873,102 S. Ct.
3440, 3449, 73 I

I I'M I lOX^HIonlnoIr omilfnln
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exclusion prejudicial "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the
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Here, Mr. Reigenborn would have called Ms, Sninr
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Snipes' mother lived at the same address as Mr. Reigenborn at the time of the assault. At trial,
M., \, ||v«. itH.i.in.j ,,. (.jid,

'in .IL. I ^j,,. I,!..., in M | IM ,;.(to my mom, she said that Bill had

gone to work. I said, okay, I'm bringing Nathan over to get some clothes. So, Ken drove me
over for - - to get Nathan some clothes for school." (I T Tr. 69; 1 -5.) On cross-examination,
M.s. Snipes coin n k i ! liLm hi

^n hil
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i^lil lu retneve tromthe

Lambourne residence, but "because my mother said Bill had gone to work, I came over." (J.T.
Tr. 82:2-9.) Ms. Snipes further testified that she was trying to stay awayfromMr. Reigenborn.
(J.T. Tr. 83:12-14.) Ms. Snipes' mother would have either confirmed or controverted Ms. Snipes'
testimony with regard to Ms. Snipes' attempts to determine Mr. Reigenborn's presence or
absencefromthe 2196 East Lambourne address on the morning of September 2,1998.
Moreover, Ms. Snipes' mother could have offered testimony with respect to Mr. Reigenborn's
mental state and mental health prior to the assault.
The testimony of Ms. Snipes' mother could have undermined Ms. Snipes' credibility and
could have demonstrated a pattern of harassment and provocation by Ms. Snipes of Mr.
Reigenborn. Evidence of such harassment and provocation would have bolstered attempts by
defense counsel to demonstrate that Mr. Reigenborn suffered diminished mental capacity and
lacked the requisite intent to commit the offense of assault. Certainly this testimony is material
and its presence may have affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, Mr. Reigenborn was
denied his constitutional right to compulsory process and is therefore entitled to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Appellant William Keith Reigenborn respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this^/ day of June, 2000.

SHANNON N. ROMERO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Addendum B

76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawfiil force or violeo.ce, th at ::a:t ises 01
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily
iiyury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Powei to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1 • [Citizenship - Due process of lav
protection,]

Equal

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

